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INTRODUCTION 
This appeal from -i f : na 1 judgment entered against 
Erma. ^: IMM^ I'IIIIII I. slipped 01 i 
t: r-at suppl Led by Lih Uniform Supply Co. , Inc. ("LSN*1 ) • By the 
use of last-minute surprise expert testimony, L&N convinced the 
j ury tl lat a person ] :)c: 11 
is wet instead of dry. :i tu^ opening Brief, Curtis explained tl lat 
tl'ip .Judgment shou : *> vacated and =» "*=*w tr1-! ordered because the 
Court erred in
 : j ,,_., •_.. , testi moi 
More specifically L ^ i: . timely identify its expert witness. 
The Cc * ir t: ne late disclosure prejudiced Curt 1:- The 
prejudice was material because Curtis could mil tub! .1 j 11 1 .-; niiiiL<.> 
rebuttal testimony, and without rebuttal testimony, effective 
• : 1: oss exami 1 lati • : >i 1 • :: >f tl: le expert was impossible Further the 
expertf s testimony was cumulative and not rebutta] tes tii 11 as 
represented by i.UJ in the Court. Moreover, t .he Court should have 
BKCIu«Ju«d I ontemplated using the last-
minute expert f « months prior +n ^ria :ause several 
errors were committee : allowing this testimony , and the jury 
\ y 11 1<I IhiMii c» ir- • fferent
 verLiict absent the erroneously 
admitted testimony, the lower court abused its discretinn. rhe 
remedy is a new trial. 
1 
Curtis also showed that all of L&N's experts' testimony 
should have been excluded because the testimony did not aid the 
jury in understanding the evidence or in determining the facts at 
issue. Rather, the testimony was based on experiments dissimilar 
to the actual accident conditions. 
In its answering Brief, L&N implicitly admits that there 
was no foundation for the experiments and the experts1 conclusions. 
Nowhere in its Brief does L&N attempt to justify the substance of 
its experts' testimony. However, L&N says that Curtis failed to 
object to the experts' qualifications or foundation (Appellee's 
Brief, pp. 8-9) . L&N also said that there was no plain error by 
the lower court, so Curtis waived his right to challenge the 
findings of the expert testimony (Appellee's Brief, pp. 12-13). 
L&N summarizes: 
Plaintiff's [Curtis'] . . . failure to 
properly and specifically object to the 
testimony of defendant's experts at the trial 
constitutes a waiver of any claim of error on 
review. The lower court did not commit plain 
error in permitting the testimony of experts 
properly presented and qualified without so 
much as one objection from plaintiff. 
L&N also contends that the last-minute testimony was 
proper because it says (1) there was no new Scheduling Order after 
the trial was continued in March of 1993; and (2) Rules 4-502(2), 
16, 26 and 3 3 do not apply. L&N also argues that Rahmeyer's 
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testimony was proper rebuttal testimony (Appellee's Brieff pp. 19-
20) . 
Finally, L&N claims that Curtis failed to marshall all of 
the evidence and show that the jury would have reached a different 
verdict if the testimony of the two experts was not permitted. 
This Reply Brief addresses L&N's arguments. 
IV. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
Curtis Properly Objected to the 
Lack of Foundation for L&N's Experts' Testimony. 
Contrary to the assertions in L&N's Brief, Curtis did 
object to the lack of foundation for L&N's experts' testimony. 
However, the objection was overruled. Subsequent objections were 
not necessary. Once the court has clearly ruled, repeated 
objections only waste the court's time and prejudice the objecting 
party in the eyes of the jury. M. H. Graham, Handbook of Federal 
Evidence. Section 103.2 at 16 (3d ed., 1991). 
POINT II 
The Lower Court Committed Plain Error 
When It Allowed L&N's Experts to Testify. 
Plain error is obvious error that is harmful. E,Q'C , 
State v, Eldredqe, 773 P.2d 29, 35 (Utah 1989). In this case, the 
lower court committed two obvious errors when it allowed both of 
L&N's experts to testify. First, the testimony could not possibly 
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comply with U.R.E. 702. Testimony on the slipperiness of ordinary 
surfaces is testimony on a subject commonly understood by the jury, 
and is excluded. Second, Whitehead v. American Motors Sales Corp.r 
801 P.2d 920, 923 (Utah 1990), unequivocally holds that for tests 
or experiments to be admissible, the tests must be conducted under 
conditions substantially similar to those of the accident. Thus, 
L&N's experts should not have been allowed to describe their wet 
mat experiments and give their conclusions derived from those 
experiments. 
That the errors were harmful is also obvious. By use of 
the improper experiments and testimony, L&N's experts convinced the 
jury that Curtis was less likely to slip on a wet surface than on 
a dry one. Thus, L&N could not have been negligent in placing a 
wet mat in front of Curtis1 office, nor could a wet mat have caused 
Curtis to slip and fall. 
POINT III 
Rahmeyer's Testimony Was Not 
Proper Rebuttal Testimony. 
L&N is wrong when it says that the last-minute surprise 
testimony of Dr. Rahmeyer was proper rebuttal testimony. A 
comparison of the Curtis deposition taken on September 29, 1992, 
more than a year prior to trial, and the testimony given at trial 
shows that Curtis had not substantively changed his description of 
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the slip and fall. Simply put, Curtis1 trial testimony did not 
necessitate rebuttal testimony from L&N's surprise expert. 
POINT IV 
The Record Unquestionably Demonstrates 
That L&N Did Not Timely Disclose 
Dr. Rahmeyer As Its Second Expert Witness 
And That Curtis Was Prejudiced 
By the Last-Minute Disclosure. 
Contrary to the claim of proper and timely disclosure 
contained in L&N's Brief, the record as summarized in Point IV of 
this Brief demonstrates that L&N did not timely disclose Drc 
Rahmeyer as an expert witness. The record also demonstrates that 
Curtis was prejudiced by the late disclosure. 
V. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
Curtis Properly Objected to the Lack 
Of Foundation for L&N's Experts' Testimony. 
A. Appellee's Brief 
Nowhere in its Brief does L&N attempt to defend the 
content of its two experts' testimony presented at trial. That is^ 
nowhere does L&N argue that the expert testimony offered by Gordon 
and Rahmeyer complies with U.R.E. 702. Nor does L&N attempt to 
justify the flawed experiments or the conclusions drawn from them. 
Instead, L&N says that Curtis, "failed to raise or lodge any 
5 
objection whatsoever to the trial testimony of defendant's experts" 
(Brief of Appellee, p. 8; see also pp. 12, 14). 
B. Discussion 
L&N is wrong when it alleges that Curtis did not object 
to the lack of foundation for the expert testimony offered by L&N. 
L&N's first expert, Pete Gordon, the mat manufacturer's employee, 
was called to determine and testify on the slip resistance of a wet 
mat on a vinyl floor. He was to evaluate whether or not the wet 
mat would be a safe mat (R. 1221, Ins. 16-24). After describing 
his experiment, an experiment L&N does not deny was dissimilar to 
the actual accident conditions, L&N asked Gordon for his 
conclusions. 
Q: Do other manufacturers agree with 
Kleentex that mats can safely be put 
in service without being dried? 
A: Yes sir. 
(R. 1232, Ins. 1-3.) 
Because the Gordon experiment was not similar to the 
conditions of the accident, Curtis properly objected on the basis 
of no foundation for the expert's conclusion. 
Mr. Gray: Objection, no foundation. I 
would like some foundation for 
this. 
(R. 1232, Ins. 4-5.) 
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However, the court overruled the objection and 
incorrectly ruled that the lack of foundation was a matter for 
cross-examination• 
The Court: Overruled. It is a matter for 
cross-examination. 
(R. 1232, Ins. 6-7.) 
However, the lower court was wrong when it ruled that the 
lack of foundation was a matter for cross-examination. See Edwards 
v. Didericksen, 597 P.2d 1328, 1331-32 (Utah 1979). Before expert 
testimony can be admitted, it must meet the requirements of U.R.E. 
702. That is, the court must find that scientific, technical or 
other special knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand 
the evidence or determine a fact in issue. Id. 
In addition, the improper foundation offered and used by 
L&N, that is, the dissimilar experiments, also were not a matter 
for cross-examination. The criteria for establishing the 
admissibility of test evidence is that the data must be relevant 
and the test must be conducted under conditions substantially 
similar to those of the actual accident. Whitehead v. American 
Motor Sales Corp., 801 P.2d 920 (Utah 1990). The lower court's 
failure to correctly apply the foregoing criteria is reversible 
error. Id. 
Moreover, Curtis1 objection preserved the lack of 
foundation issue for appeal. A subsequent objection was not 
7 
necessary. See also, Onveabor v. Pro-Roofing. Inc.r 787 P.2d 525, 
528 (Utah App. 1990) (a matter is sufficiently raised if it is 
submitted to the trial court and the trial court is offered an 
opportunity to rule on the issue). Simply put, once a party has 
objected and attained a ruling clearly indicating the attitude of 
the court, the party is not required to repeat the objection during 
the examination of the same witness or another witness each time 
the issue comes up. Once the court has clearly ruled, repeat 
objections serve only to waste the courtfs time and prejudice the 
objecting party in the eyes of a jury. E.g. United States v. 
Alvarez, 584 F.2d 694, 695 (5th Cir. 1978); Ladd, Common Mistakes 
in the Technigue of Trial, 22 Iowa Law Review 609 (1937) . 
As set forth on pages 22-24 of the Appellant's opening 
Brief, the substance and structure of Rahmeyer's testimony was 
similar and cumulative to Gordon's testimony. Thus, no useful 
purpose would have been served by Curtis objecting again to a lack 
of foundation for the Rahmeyer testimony. In short, the lower 
court had already ruled and indicated its attitude that a lack of 
foundation was a matter for cross-examination. 
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POINT II 
The Lower Court Committed Plain Error 
When It Allowed L&N's Experts to Testify. 
A. Appellee's Brief 
On page 13 of its Brief, L&N alleges that there was no 
plain error committed by the court. However, L&N does not cite any 
legal or factual support for its allegation. Nor does L&N show why 
the testimony describing the experiments not similar to the 
accident conditions and the conclusions based on the experiments 
was proper. Instead, L&N incorrectly alleges that since Curtis did 
not properly and specifically object to the two experts' testimony, 
the lower court must not have committed plain error (Appellee's 
Brief, p. 13). However, as hereinafter set forth, plain error is 
not disproved when a party fails to make an objection. Instead, 
the plain error doctrine comes into play when a party neglects to 
make a timely objection. 
B. Discussion 
1. The Plain Error Criteria 
The policy considerations underlining the plain error 
rule were explained by the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Eldredae, 
773 P.2d 29, 36 (1989), as follows: 
[T]he premise of [Utah] Rule [of Evidence] 
103 (d) is that the ends of justice must not be 
lost sight of in the pursuit of procedural 
regularity in that when an error is plain, a 
trial court can legitimately be said to have 
had a reasonable opportunity to address and 
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correct it, even in the absence of an 
objection. 
The Eldredae court went on to explain that the first 
requirement for finding a plain error is that the error be plain, 
and that from an examination of the record the reviewing court must 
be able to say that it should have been obvious to the trial court 
that it had committed an error. Id. at 35. Factors in determining 
whether an error is obvious include whether an evidentiary 
requirement is in writing and expressly requires conduct which the 
court does not follow and whether the trial court has the benefit 
of an appellate decision on the evidentiary problem at hand. Id. 
The second somewhat interrelated requirement for finding plain 
error is that the error be harmful. Id. 
Applying the foregoing criteria to the case at bar shows 
that the lower court committed two obvious errors. First, the 
lower court allowed L&N's experts to testify on the slipperiness of 
wet rugs and wet floors, even though the testimony could not 
possibly assist the jury to understand the evidence or to determine 
a fact issue as required by U.R.E. 702. Slipperiness of ordinary 
surfaces is a subject commonly described by lay witnesses and 
understood by the jury. For that reason, it is excluded. Wolfe v. 
Bertrand Bowling Lanes, Inc.. 351 N.E.2d 313, 321 (111. App. 1976). 
Moreover, allowing L&Nfs experts to describe their experiments was 
also plain error. Whitehead v« American Motors Sales Corp., 801 
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P.2d 920, 931 (Utah 1990) , unequivocally holds that tests are to be 
conducted under conditions substantially similar to those of the 
actual occurrence. As set forth on pages 30-34 of Appellant's 
opening Brief, the experiments conducted by Gordon and Rahmeyer 
were not similar to the slip and fall accident. 
In addition to the foregoing errors being obvious, they 
were also harmful. L&N is mistaken when it alleges that Curtis 
must marshall all of the evidence and show that the jury would have 
reached a different result if the expert testimony was not 
permitted (Brief of Appellee, pp. 20-21). The requirement to 
marshall the evidence occurs in those appeals wherein the basis of 
the appeal is insufficient evidence to support the verdict. See, 
e.g. , Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exchange, 817 P.2d 789, 799-800 (Utah 
1991). However, when, as in this case, the appeal is based on the 
court's allowance or disallowance of expert testimony, the test is 
whether the error was a substantial influence in bringing about a 
different verdict. E.g., Redevelopment Agency v. Tanner, 740 P.2d 
1296, 1303-1304 (Utah 1987). In this case, there is no doubt that 
the improper expert testimony led to a verdict different than would 
have occurred if the testimony had properly been excluded. L&N 
Uniform Supply Co. won this case because of one, and only one, 
reason — by the improper use of expert testimony — it was able to 
convince a jury that Curtis was less likely to slip if his boots, 
and/or mat, and/or floor were wet rather than dry. Absent the 
11 
improper testimony, the jury would have easily concluded that 
placing a wet mat in front of Curtis' office was negligent and 
caused him to slip and fall. 
POINT III 
Rahmeyer's Testimony Was Not 
Proper Rebuttal Testimony. 
In its Brief, L&N says that Dr. Rahmeyer's testimony was 
proper rebuttal testimony. L&N alleges that Curtis' description of 
his slip and fall at trial changed from the description given in 
his deposition and that Rahmeyer was retained as a rebuttal witness 
to address the possibility of Curtis slipping on the wet mat (Brief 
of Appellee, p. 19) . In the lower court, L&N told the same story. 
The Court: 
Mr. Christensen: 
The Court: 
Mr. Christensen: 
Is the expert a rebuttal 
testimony witness? 
He is, your Honor. At 
this juncture he is in 
rebuttal to the testimony 
of Erman Curtis, which is 
was presented this 
afternoon. 
What testimony is that? 
That is, in Mr. Curtis' 
deposition, and through 
the entire course of this 
lawsuit, he has 
maintained the position 
that the rug slipped 
underneath him. And his 
testimony today, he made 
reference to the fact 
that he wasn't sure 
whether his foot slipped 
12 
on the rug or whether it 
was the rug that slipped. 
(R. 1100.) 
And in the lower court, Curtis' counsel told the court 
that Curtis' description of the slip and fall had not changed, so 
Rahmeyer could not be a rebuttal witness. 
The Court: Why wouldn't it be 
appropriate rebuttal 
testimony to have an 
expert address both of 
those issues [slipped on 
the carpet, mat slipped 
on the floor]? 
Mr. Gray: No, I understand that 
aspect. I understand 
that it would 
normally, rebuttal on 
something like that would 
be appropriate. The 
problem is that this is 
the same thing he said in 
his deposition a long 
time ago. He said he 
stepped on the mat, it 
slipped, then he went 
forward on the floor, his 
foot did, and then he 
went into the wall. This 
is not anything new. 
(R. 1263-64.) 
The lower court concluded that Rahmeyer was a rebuttal 
witness and allowed him to testify. 
The court orders that the rebuttal witness 
[Rahmeyer] is permitted to testify regarding 
both issues on the rug: whether or not the 
plaintiff [Curtis] slipped because of a slick 
surface on the rug, and then slipped on the 
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adjoining tile; or whether or not the bottom 
or the back of the rug, next to the tile, 
slipped, and the rug fell from under the feet 
of the plaintiff. 
(R. 1275-76.) 
However, a comparison of the Curtis deposition testimony 
and the trial transcript shows that Curtis did not change his 
story, so the court's conclusion that Rahmeyer was a proper 
rebuttal witness was wrong. That portion of Curtis' deposition 
describing the slip and fall is attached in the Addendum to this 
Brief. Abstracts of the deposition follow: 
Q: When you stepped through the door, you 
stepped onto the mat? 
A: Correct. 
Q: Did the mat move at that point? 
A: No. 
* * * 
Q: Okay, now why don't you describe for me 
what happened as you approached the north 
end of the mat. 
A: I got closer to the end, I assume, I 
turned around. I started to slip and I 
tried to grasp but my feet came off of 
the mat. My right foot had come off of 
the mat and I popped my neck and felt my 
neck pop and I started twisting and I 
ended up falling into the wall. 
* * * 
Q: The left foot slipped? Did your left 
foot slip on the mat or did the mat move 
when your left foot struck the mat? 
14 
A: My foot — I would just say the mat 
moved. Kind of a motion like it was 
coming back. 
A: Let me say that to you one more time. 
Maybe I threw you and I might have threw 
myself at that point. As I came through 
and made the turn I opened the door. I 
came to the door and I just walked normal 
and my foot slipped as I got closer to 
the end like the mat was coming with it. 
And then I kind of went into a squirrelly 
position trying to grab my balance 
because as my other foot came off, I was 
going every which way and had popped my 
neck at that point. 
A: I did not assume that the mat was wet. I 
really had no knowledge of what part of 
it was wet, the floor or the mat. 
(Deposition of Erman Curtis, 29th day of September, 1992, p. 37, 
Ins. 19-23; p. 38, Ins. 3-11, 21-25; p. 39, Ins. 21-25; p. 40, lns0 
1-5; p. 46, Ins. 16-18.) 
Curtis' deposition testimony is essentially identical to 
that which he gave at trial. At the trial, Curtis described the 
event as follows: 
When I got to the end of the mat, I felt like 
the mat had slipped back and I had started 
slipping. I assume my right foot went off of 
the mat at that point and I don't know what 
way I was going at that point other than I 
ended up into the wall on my right knee. 
(R. 1253, Ins. 17-24.) 
In summary, contrary to the allegations of L&N, Curtis 
did not change his legal or factual theories at the trial* Hence, 
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the Rahmeyer testimony clearly was not rebuttal testimony. It was, 
as set forth in Appellant's Brief, mostly cumulative testimony. 
Since L&N mistakenly represented that Rahmeyer was a 
rebuttal witness, and since the sole and erroneous basis for the 
lower court allowing Rahmeyer to testify was the lower court's 
conclusion that Rahmeyer was a rebuttal witness, this Court should 
label Rahmeyer's testimony for what it was — surprise testimony 
warranting a new trial pursuant to U.R.C.P. 59. 
POINT IV 
The Record Unquestionably Demonstrates 
That L&N Did Not Timely Disclose 
Dr. Rahmeyer As Its Second Expert Witness 
And That Curtis Was Prejudiced 
By the Last-Minute Disclosure. 
L&N is wrong when it alleges that Dr. Rahmeyer was 
properly and timely disclosed to Curtis (Brief of Appellee, pp. 15-
16). L&N is also incorrect when it says that Rules 16, 26, 33 and 
4-502 do not apply or were satisfied (Brief of Appellee, p. 16). 
The record discloses otherwise. 
The lower court's one and only Scheduling Order entered 
pursuant to U.R.C.P. 16 required discovery to be completed by March 
1, 1993 (R. 49-51). By Stipulation and Order, the parties extended 
the discovery cut-off date to March 25, 1993 (R. 62-64). 
Rule 26(b)(4)(a)(1) allows litigants to serve an 
interrogatory requiring the other party to identify each person 
16 
whom the other party expects to call as an expert. Curtis served 
such an interrogatory, and L&N answered as follows: 
L&N Uniform intends to call Mr. David Pete 
Gordon as an expert witness (Brief of 
Appellant, Addendum Exhibit 3). 
Pursuant to Rule 26(e), L&N was under a duty to 
supplement its answer to the interrogatory. 
Thereafter, L&N requested and obtained a continuance of 
the trial so that it could conduct additional discovery (R. 122-
26). The trial was continued to September 7, 1993, but the court 
did not extend the discovery cut-off date (R. 125-26). By August 
26, 1993, the depositions of each party's sole expert were taken 
(R. 116-19, 138-39). 
At trial, the lower court was informed that during the 
summer of 1993, counsel had a gentlemen's agreement to extend the 
discovery cut-off date. The court asked each side to explain the 
agreement (R. 1225). Curtis' counsel replied that L&N's counsel 
"would have to speak to the oral agreement because I wasn't there" 
(R. 825). Whereupon, L&N's counsel told the court: 
Before the initial discovery cut-off expired, 
plaintiff [Curtis], through his counsel, 
wanted to take the deposition of Pete Gordon, 
our expert. He identified that he lives in La 
Grange, Georgia. I was advised at that time 
that Walter Thomas was their expert, and he 
also resided in the Georgia area and wanted to 
know if we could take their depositions at the 
same time. I agreed to that. We went to 
Georgia. They took Mr. Gordon's deposition 
first. I took Walter Thomas' deposition. 
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At that time, he told me that he didn't have 
any opinions. 
* * * 
I then pursued with Mr. Sullivan when we could 
take Mr. Thomas' deposition. Beyond the 
initial discovery cut-off, Mr. Thomas was not 
available. He didn't have his finalized 
opinions. I agreed to go ahead and take his 
deposition even though discovery had been cut 
off because I had been told of Mr. Thomas . . 
. . We took his deposition 12 days before 
trial [12 days before the September 7th trial 
date]. 
(R. 1225-26.) 
L&N's counsel went on to say, "That's when [August 26, 
1993] I told Steve [Curtis' counsel] that I was going to get my own 
expert" (R. 1226). L&N's counsel then mistakenly told the court 
that, "I immediately advised them of his [Rahmeyer's] identity and 
that he was available for testimony. They could take his 
deposition and do whatever they wanted to do" (R. 1226). However, 
later L&N's counsel acknowledged that he did not immediately notify 
Curtis of Rahmeyer's identity. In fact, he did not reveal 
Rahmeyer's identity until October 1, 1993 — five weeks later. 
As soon as I was prepared, as soon as I knew I 
was going to use him as a witness, I advised 
them as soon as his opinions were finalized. 
If I had told them on October 1, I would have 
said that we had contacted a guy by the name 
of Bill Rahmeyer. As soon as his testimony is 
done, we will let you know so that we can take 
his deposition. 
(R. 1270.) 
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On October 5 th, the court held a pre-trial settlement 
conference. However, L&N did not disclose Rahmeyer as an expert 
witness. Twenty-three days later, and 18 days prior to trial, L&N 
finally notified Curtis that it was going to call Rahmeyer (R. 179-
80; R. 865, Ins. 10-27). 
For approximately two months prior to the disclosure, L&N 
knew it was going to call Rahmeyer as its expert witness (R. 1270, 
1310-11). 
When L&N finally disclosed Rahmeyer, Curtis told L&N to 
file a Rule 4-502 motion. When L&N refused, Curtis moved for a 
protective order and requested the court to exclude Rahmeyer as a 
witness (R. 177-192). The trial court considered the motion on the 
next to the last day of trial. At the hearing, L&N told the court 
that Rahmeyer was necessary to rebut the testimony of Curtis (R. 
1300). However, as set forth in Point III of this Brief, Rahmeyer 
was not a rebuttal witness. 
In summary, in no way, shape or form did L&N timely 
supplement its answer and name Rahmeyer as an expert witness. The 
ways in which Curtis was prejudiced are set forth on pages 19-21 of 
the Appellant's opening Brief. To summarize, Curtis could not 
obtain rebuttal testimony at that late date, and Curtis could not 
effectively cross-examine Rahmeyer. 
Moreover, there is no question that the error in allowing 
the last-minute testimony had a substantial influence in bringing 
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about a different verdict. In contrast to the case of Bambrouah v. 
Bethers, 552 P.2d 1286, 1290 (Utah 1976), cited in L&N's Brief, the 
evidence erroneously admitted is not of limited scope. By use of 
the improper testimony, L&N was able to convince the jury that 
Curtis was less likely to slip on a wet surface than on a dry one, 
so L&N could not have been negligent and could not have caused 
Curtis to slip and fall. 
Finally, this case is not like Barrett v. Denver & Rio 
Grande W. R. , 830 P.2d 291 (Utah 1991) (also cited in Curtis' 
Brief). In Barrett, there was no discovery cut-off date Order. In 
this case, there was an Order, but the parties informally extended 
the discovery to the September 7, 1993 trial date. There was not, 
however, any agreement to extend the cut-off date beyond that 
point. Thus, the Court should have excluded the last-minute 
surprise testimony. 
VI. 
CONCLUSION 
Curtis timely objected to the lack of foundation for 
L&N's expert testimony. Moreover, the Court committed plain error 
when it allowed L&N's experts to describe their experiments and the 
conclusions derived therefrom. In addition, Rahmeyerfs testimony 
was not rebuttal testimony. Finally, the record unquestionably 
shows that L&N did not timely disclose Rahmeyer as an expert 
witness, and that Curtis was prejudiced by the late disclosure. 
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For these reasons, the Judgment should be vacated and the 
case remanded for trial. 
Respectfully submitted this 12th day of April, 1995. 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
ALBERT W. GRAY 3 F 
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1 I know? 
2 1 A. I don't know. 
3 Q. Were they the same color? 
4 A. Yes. 
5 Q. When you -- apparently you came down a 
6 hall and then turned to the east --
7 A. No. As I came out of the office I would 
8 turn to the west and then go south and then I would 
9 again turn west. And after entering a door I woulc* 
10 be heading back north. 
11 J Q. Okay. I understand. 
12 A. It comes like this, like this, like this 
13 and then back in. 
14 J Q. And as you were headed back north, 
15 I that's when the accident occurred. Correct? 
16 A. Correct. 
17 J Q. Now, why don't you describe for me, in 
18 as much detail as you can remember, how the accident 
19 I happened. 
20 A. Okay. I turned around and came out and 
21 I walked down, like I stated before, down and made 
22 the turn and I walked across the first one. I 
23 didn't pay attention to what I walked across. I 
24 come out, I am walking, picking my feet up. The 
25 mat, the last mat as I came through had moved a 
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1 little bit which I slipped at. I started to slip. 
2 Q. Why don't you describe what you mean by 
3 that for me. 
4 A. As if your feet are there, my feet 
5 slipped on the one mat and it had moved when I 
6 tried — 
7 Q. The very first one you walked across? 
8 J A. No. The second mat. After I came 
9 I through the door. 
10 I Q. So when you stepped on it, it moved 
11 some? 
12 A. Up by the front part of it. 
13 Q. Do you have any idea as to the 
14 J dimensions of the mat? 
15 A. I have no idea how long they are. 
16 Q. Was it three feet wide, I assume, 
17 something like that? 
18 J A. I can't assume it is three feet wide 
19 because I really don't know the width of it. All I 
20 know is it is a hallway mat. 
21 Q. Okay. Was it longer than it was wide? 
22 A. Longer, yes. 
23 J Q. I'm trying to get some feeling for 
24 whether it was a long rectangle. 
25 I A. It was longer than it was wide, yes. 
Diana Kent, C.S.R., R.P.R. 
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1 I Q. By a significant amount? Was it twice 
2 I as long as it was wide? 
3 | A. Possibly. 
4 I Q. Okay. And so when you first stepped on 
5 | it as you just turned and headed north, you said the 
6 I mat moved some. Is that correct? 
7 A. As I got closer to the end of the mat, 
8 heading north. I already came through the door. 
9 Q. Right. 
10 A. And it is like maybe a one, two step and 
11 here you are at the end of it. 
12 Q. Was the mat -- were there a couple of 
13 steps on the regular floor, the flooring? 
14 A. In between it? 
15 Q. Yes. Before you reach the mat, or was 
16 I the mat there as soon as you walked to the north? 
17 A. As soon as I opened the door the mat was 
18 there. 
19 Q. When you stepped through the door you 
20 stepped onto the mat? 
21 A. Correct. 
22 Q. Did the mat move at that point? 
23 A. No. 
24 Q. And then you continued whatever number 
25 J of steps you were until you got towards the north 
Diana Kent, C.S.R., R.P.R. 
L 
1 end of the mat. 
2 A. Yes. 
3 Q. Okay. Nov, why don't you describe for 
4 me what happened as you approached the north end of 
5 I the mat. 
6 A. I got closer to the end, I assume, and 
7 turned around and I started to slip and I tried to 
8 I grasp but my feet came off the mat. My right foot 
9 had came off the mat and I popped my neck and felt 
10 J my neck pop and I started twisting and I ended up 
11 falling into the wall. 
12 Q. Okay. Let me ask you some questions. 
13 Were you carrying anything at that point? 
14 A. No. 
15 Q. Now, were you just walking normally to 
16 the north when you started to slip? 
17 A. Correct. 
18 Q. Okay. Do you recall which foot started 
19 to slip first? 
20 A. Left. 
21 Q. The left foot slipped. Did your left 
22 J foot slip on the mat or did the mat move when your 
23 left foot struck the mat? 
24 J A. My foot -- I would just say the mat 
25 | moved. Kind of a motion like it was coming back* 
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Q. Okay. I think you indicated you had 
been picking your feet up so you didn't scuff 
anything or stumble on anything? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Okay. Were there any ripples or, say, 
humps in the mat? 
A. None. 
Q. Okay. So the mat, when you turned the 
corner to step onto the mat, it was properly flat? 
A. As far as I know. 
Q. Okay. And then as you got towards the 
end of the mat, when your left foot came down, then 
the mat slipped. Is that correct? 
A. Correct. 
Q. Okay. The only reason I'm asking is you 
said you turned around and the mat slipped. And 
that is why I wanted to make sure that you were 
walking in the straight north direction and as you 
were just normally walking, that's when your left 
foot came down and the mat began to slip. 
A. Let me say that to you one more time. 
Maybe I threw you and I might have threw myself at 
that point. As I came through and made the turn, I 
opened the door, I came to the door and I just 
walked normal and my foot slipped as I got closer to 
Diana Kent, C.S.R., R.P.R. 
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1 | the end, like the mat was coming with it. And then 
2 I I kind of went into a squirrelly position, trying to 
3 grab my balance because, as my other foot came off, 
4 I I was going every which way and it popped my neck at 
5 I that point. 
6 Q. So both feet were on the mat when you 
7 actually started --
8 A. No. Both my feet were not on the mat. 
9 When I started into the door — 
10 Q. No. See, you may have misunderstood. 
11 I A. When I started to slip? 
12 Q. Yes. 
13 I A. My left foot was, because I was bringing 
14 the right foot off. 
15 Q. Your right foot had been on the mat and 
16 your left foot, you stepped forward and as you 
17 picked up your right foot on your stride, the mat 
18 I slipped? 
19 A. Yes. 
20 Q. So it wasn't as you were placing your 
21 left foot down that the mat slipped. Does that make 
22 sense? 
23 A. No, it doesn't. 
24 Q. As people walk, there's some point where 
25 both feet are on the ground and you pick up one foot 
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1 and set that down and both feet are on the ground 
2 I for a moment and then you pick up the next foot. 
3 Correct? That's the way most people walk. 
4 A. Okay. 
5 Q. And it is difficult sometimes to 
6 verbalize these things and to say them so that the 
7 record is clear, and that's one of the reasons that 
8 I'm kind of struggling with this. And I want to 
9 make sure when, in the process of your normal 
10 stride, this accident occurred. And I guess what 
11 J I'm trying to find out is was it when you stepped 
12 down with your left foot that the mat slipped or was 
13 it when you picked up your right foot and started 
14 your next stride that your left foot slipped? Does 
15 J that make sense? 
16 I A. Give me one second and let me run that 
17 back what you said. 
18 Q. I'm not concerned about the substantive 
19 answer. I want to make sure that you understand my 
20 J question. 
21 I A. I'm trying to understand what you are 
22 saying there. I guess it would be my left foot. I 
23 picked my right up to move and the left was the one 
24 that started to move. That's when it started to 
25 move. My left foot would be going and my right foot 
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1 I would be coming down. 
2 Q. Right. I guess what I'm trying to say 
3 is -- you have lived in Utah your whole life, 
4 J haven't you? 
5 A. Yes. 
6 Q. So I'm sure there have been times when, 
7 as you have been walking out in the winter time, you 
8 have had to walk across areas that are slippery with 
9 snow or ice. Correct? 
10 A. Definitely. 
11 J Q. There are times when you put your foot 
12 down and step on something that is slippery and as 
13 you put your foot down that's when your foot 
14 slides. You have experienced that, haven't you? 
15 A. Yes. 
16 Q. And what I'm trying to find out is 
17 whether that was the way this accident happened; 
18 that as you put your foot down, that's when your 
19 balance was lost and the mat moved or whether you 
20 I were there and you felt like you were stable and a? 
21 you picked up your right foot to continue your step 
22 or your stride, that's when the mat moved and caused 
23 you to lose your balance. 
24 A. At that point I didn't have even an 
25 opportunity, when I got to that, started to move, I 
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couldn't tell you which foot was flying which way 
other than the left foot when I come back, and then 
when my right foot was down, I was every which way. 
Q. Did you feel like your weight was on 
your left foot when the mat slipped? 
A. Correct. 
Q. Okay. And as a result, you twisted to 
try to regain your balance? 
A. Yes. I was slipping. I left scuff 
marks all over the place. 
Q. Okay. Did you ever actually fall down 
onto the ground? 
A. I ended up on my knee and into the wall. 
Q. Which knee did you hit? 
A. My right knee. 
Q. And your right shoulder into the wall? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Was your right knee on the regular floor 
or was it on the mat? 
A. It was on the regular floor. 
Q. Was that to the north of the end of the 
mat? 
A. North. 
Q. Okay. You say you left scuff marks. 
Was that on the floor or was that a figure of speech 
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or what? 
A. Well, I call it scuff marks. It was a 
moisture and the dirt from the bottom of your 
shoes. Your feet. Off your shoes. You could see 
the black marks on there where the moisture was. 
Q. What kind of shoes were you wearing at 
the time? 
A. 
Q. 
recall? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Cowboy boots. 
What kind of cowboy boots, do you 
Tony Llamas. 
Do you know what kind of sole they had? 
No. 
Do you still have those? 
Yes, I do. 
Have they been resoled? 
No. 
Were there actual marks left on the 
flooring from your boots as you were trying to 
regain your balance? 
A. Black marks is what I said. 
Q. And what kind of flooring was it 
underneath the mat? 
A. What is it? Linoleum or tile or 
something. I imagine it would be linoleum because 
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we buff it. 
Q. Okay. Do you know how wide the hall is, 
approximately? 
A. No. Probably three feet, four feet. 
Q. Was it wide enough that you could stand 
with your arms outstretched on both sides and touch 
the sides of both walls? 
A. I don't know. I never tried it. 
Q. Okay. You said you felt your neck pop. 
Do you recall where, during the process of losing 
your balance and things, that that happened? 
A. Right at first is all I know. 
Q. Okay. And then you went down to your 
right knee? 
A. Well, I twisted prior to going down to 
my right knee and ended up into the corner and I had 
my knee up and my shoulder was into the wall. 
Q. Okay. Was it along the side of the 
wall, as I understand which would probably be the 
east side of that hall? 
A. Yes. It would be the east side. 
Q. Somewhere to the north of the end of the 
mat? 
A. Correct. 
Q. Was it a foot or two feet or do you have 
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1 I any idea as to how far that was? 
2 I A, I have no idea how far it was. 
3 Q. Okay. You indicated that you felt like 
4 I there was some moisture on the mat. 
5 A. I didn't indicate that it was moisture 
6 on the mat. I had no idea what had caused this. 
7 Q. Okay. Maybe I misunderstood. I thought 
8 you mentioned something about the dirt on the bottom 
9 of your shoes and the moisture from that. 
10 I A. This was off where I had made the mats 
11 I basically right here. And I felt myself all over 
12 this floor right at the edge of that mat. 
13 Q. Right. 
14 A. So I assumed that this thing is wet. 
15 Q. Okay. 
16 A. I did not assume that the mat was wet. 
17 I really had no knowledge of what part of it was 
18 J wet, the floor or the mat. 
19 Q. Okay. And so what happened after you 
20 fell into the wall then? 
21 A. Well, I probably sat there for probably 
22 about 15, 20 seconds and I started to get up and one 
23 of the dispatch drivers was coming into the hall 
24 while I was still into the side of the wall. 
25 Q. And do you know his name? 
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